Very recommended if you care about this topic (who shouldn't care about that?). I'm posting part of the conclusion here, get an idea if you want:
"We consider the arguments that are provoked by particular cases.
We try to develop the reasons that lead us to go one
way rather than another.
And then we listen to the reasons of other people.
And sometimes we're persuaded to revise our view.
Other times we're challenged, at least, to shore up and
strengthen our view.
But this is how moral argument proceeds, with justice, and so it
seems to me, also with questions of the good life.
Now, there remains a further worry, and it's a liberal worry.
if we're going to think of our disagreements about morality and
religion, as bound up with our disagreements about justice, how are
we ever going to find our way to a society that accords respect to fellow
citizens with whom we disagree?
It depends, I think, on which conception of respect one accepts.
On the liberal conception, to respect our fellow citizen's moral and
religious convictions is, so to speak, to ignore them
for political purposes--
To rise above, or abstract from, or to set aside those moral and religious
convictions, to leave them disturbed, to carry out our political debate
without reference to them.
But that isn't the only way, or perhaps even the most plausible way,
of understanding the mutual respect on which democratic life depends.
There is a different conception of respect, according to which we respect
our fellow citizen's moral and religious convictions not by ignoring,
but by engaging them, by attending to them, sometimes by challenging and
contesting them, sometimes by listening and learning from them.
Now, there's no guarantee that a politics of moral and religious
tension and engagement will lead, in any given case, to agreement.
There's no guarantee it will lead even to appreciation for the moral and
religious convictions of others.
It's always possible, after all, that learning more about a religious or a
moral doctrine will lead us to like it less.
But the respect of deliberation and engagement, seems to me a more
adequate, more suitable ideal for a pluralist society.
And to the extent that our moral and religious disagreements reflect some
ultimate plurality of human goods, the politics of moral engagement will
better enable us, so it seems to me, to appreciate the distinctive goods
our different lives express.
When we first came together, some 13 weeks ago, I spoke of the exhilaration
of political philosophy, and also of its dangers.
But how philosophy works, and has always worked, by estranging us from
the familiar, by unsettling our settled assumptions.
And I tried to warn you that once the familiar turns strange, once we begin
to reflect on our circumstance, it's never quite the same again.
I hope you have, by now, experienced at least a little of this unease,
because this is the tension that animates critical reflection, and
political improvement, and maybe even the moral life as well.
And so our argument comes to an end in a sense, but in another sense goes on.
Why, we asked at the outset, why do these arguments keep going, even if
they raise questions that are impossible ever finally to resolve?
The reason is that we live some answer to these questions all the time.
In our public life and in our personal lives, philosophy is inescapable, even
if it sometimes seems impossible.
We began with the thought of Comte, that skepticism is a resting place for
human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings, but it
is no dwelling place for permanent settlement.
To allow ourselves simply to acquiesce in skepticism or in complacence, Comte
wrote, can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason.
The aim of this course has been to awaken the restlessness of reason, and
to see where it might lead.
And if we have done at least that, and if the restlessness continues to
afflict you in the days and years to come, then we together have achieved
no small thing.